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Abstract
Knowledge about economic environmental tradeoffs is a prerequisite to evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness of alterna-
tive policy instruments to control non-point source pollution (NPS). Failure to explicitly account for the impact of the spatial 
combination of alternative management practices on pollution contribution rates while quantifying these tradeoffs may cause 
relative comparisons between alternative policy instruments to control NPS pollution inappropriate. The main objective of 
this research is to develop a spatial decision support system able to quantify cost-effective economic environmental tradeoffs 
of maintaining alternative pollution standards taking the interrelated linkages between various agricultural management 
practices into account. The system is used to establish a benchmark tradeoff curve by means of which alternative policy 
instruments to control NPS pollution can be compared to determine their relative cost-effectiveness. Tradeoff analyses indi-
cated that the pollution contribution factor plays a cardinal role in determining pollution abatement cost and therefore the 
benchmark. The importance of the contribution factor highlights the necessity of taking the interdependencies between 
management units into account when modelling economic environmental tradeoffs. Catchment level tradeoffs showed that 
the nitrate water quality indicator can be improved with little cost due to both positive and negative tradeoffs at the sub-catch-
ment level. Significant variability exists at the sub-catchment level when nitrate pollution abatement and abatement cost are 
concerned. The conclusion is that care should be taken not to compare the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative policy 
instruments to control NPS pollution based on catchment level tradeoffs alone.
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Introduction
Past efforts to protect the quality of South Africa’s water 
resources were concentrated mainly on the control of effluents 
from point sources. Despite these efforts an apparent deteriora-
tion in the water quality of the country’s surface waters is being 
observed (Pegram et al., 1997), reasons being the fact that in 
many catchments there are zones where non-point source (NPS) 
contributions are significant or even dominant. Quibell (2000) 
argues that a lack of legislative and regulatory authority on the 
one hand and poorly defined linkages between implementable 
management actions and the processes that lead to NPS pollu-
tion on the other hand have hampered the management of NPS 
pollution sources in the past. 
 The National Water Act (Act36 of 1998) for the first time 
provides the legislative means to target NPS pollution with spe-
cific source-directed measures (Quibell, 2000). No specific dif-
ferentiation is made between point-source and NPS pollution 
in the National Water Act and allows for the development of 
source-specific procedures that address both point-source and 
NPS pollution from the source. However, it is difficult to design 
policy to control agricultural NPS pollution. In part this is due 
to the complex relationship between agricultural production 
and damages from water pollution involving physical, biologi-
cal and economic links. How well NPS pollution control policy 
performs often depends on how well these links are understood 
(Ribaudo et al., 1999). Economically efficient solutions are usu-
ally not achievable because no market for water quality exists 
and therefore the benefit function from improving water quality 
is rarely available if at all. Tietenberg (2000) cautions the use 
of non-market valuation techniques to quantify these benefits 
arguing that while these methods may provide estimates that 
are good enough to indicate that the benefits from water quality 
improvements are large and worth pursuing, it may not be reli-
able enough to use in choosing an economically efficient level 
of pollution. Using the correct benefits is especially important 
because pollution abatement costs are high. In the absence of 
reliable benefit estimates a method commonly used to provide 
information regarding economic environmental tradeoffs is to 
conduct cost effectiveness analysis (Tietenberg, 2000). Environ-
mental policies are cost-effective if they achieve some measur-
able objectives or goals at least cost. Cost-effective outcomes 
define actions that would optimally be taken to satisfy NPS 
pollution policy goals in an ideal world where the set of policy 
instruments is not restricted and there are no transaction costs 
associated with implementing optimally designed policies (Rib-
audo et al., 1999). Given these conditions cost-effective solu-
tions are rarely attained in practice. As a second-best alternative 
the best possible outcome would achieve policy goals at lowest 
cost, given the types of instruments that are used and the cost 
associated with using them. While second-best alternatives are 
optimal in practice, their economic performance in the sense of 
being able to achieve a specific goal at least cost is still measured 
relative to the ideal of a cost-effective baseline (Ribaudo et al., 
1999). Thus, a cost-effective solution provides a benchmark to 
compare the cost-effectiveness of alternative policy instruments 
that are used to combat pollution.
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 Knowledge about economic environmental tradeoffs is a 
prerequisite to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of alternative pol-
icy instruments to control NPS pollution. Typically information 
on the cost-effectiveness is generated through the combined use 
of mathematical programming techniques and models that are 
able to quantify the environmental impacts of alternative man-
agement strategies (Lacroix et al., 2006; Bonham et al., 2004; 
Westra and Olson, 2001,). Early efforts to quantify these trade-
offs revolved around the reduction of pollution emissions using 
aggregated field-scale emissions thereby ignoring all the other 
processes that yield the final water quality. The implication of 
ignoring these processes is that areas with high field-scale emis-
sions may not contribute significantly to water pollution at a spe-
cific location. Relative comparisons between alternative policy 
instruments may therefore be inappropriate when ignoring the 
interrelated linkages between agricultural production practices 
and pollution damage. Qiu and Prato (1999) used an NPS pollu-
tion simulation model to generate information for a spatial math-
ematical programming model to generate cost-effective tradeoff 
curves. These researchers aggregated the results of different 
hydrological response units based on exogenously determined 
contribution rates thereby assuming that management practices 
will not affect contribution rates. However, in irrigated agri-
culture different combinations of management practices may 
alter contribution rates. The main objective of this research is 
to develop a spatial decision support system able to quantify 
cost-effective economic environmental tradeoffs of maintain-
ing alternative pollution standards taking the interrelated link-
ages between various agricultural management practices into 
account. More specifically the procedures of Qiu and Prato 
(1999) are augmented to allow management practices to change 
contribution rates. The quantified tradeoff curves provide an 
upper benchmark with which alternative policy instruments to 
control NPS pollution can be compared to determine their rela-
tive cost-effectiveness.
Conceptual framework and model specifications
Segerson (1988) was the first to propose the use of an ambient-
based tax to control NPS pollution. Her research showed that 
a uniform tax based on ambient water quality can achieve an 
efficient level of NPS pollution in a catchment with multiple 
polluters only when the marginal benefits of abating pollution 
are constant. Horan et al. (1998) extended Segerson’s analysis 
by exploring the design of uniform ambient-based taxes when 
each firm has a multiple choice set. Although the polluters pay 
a uniform marginal tax rate per unit of additional ambient pol-
lution the correct marginal incentives are maintained since the 
polluters do not pay the same rate per unit of pollution abatement 
(Segerson, 1988). The latter depends on each polluter’s contribu-
tion to marginal ambient water quality levels. 
 Qiu (1996) used the concept that each polluter (catchment) 
contributes differently to marginal water-quality problems to 
derive a conceptual framework with variable economic incen-
tives that allows for the implementation of the tax at sub-catch-
ment level. Following Qiu (1996) the least-cost framework with 
variable economic incentives can be developed by introducing 
the concept of pollution contribution rate.
 Suppose there are J farms which have their own production 
activities which generate emissions. Let yj be the production bun-
dle of farm j with yjn being the n
th element (positive or negative) 
of that vector. Positive activities represent outputs and negative 
ones are inputs. There are N goods or activities, i.e., n = 1, ..., N. 
Emissions by farm j are nonnegative and are denoted by zj. Farm 
j’s production set is given implicitly by f j (yj, zj)≤ 0. These rela-
tionships become equalities when the farms fully exploit their 
production abilities, which are assumed here. It is assumed that 
the objective of society is to limit the aggregate pollution to Z*. 
Aggregate pollution is a continuous and differentiable function 
of emissions generated by all farms, h(z), where z is a vector of 
emissions generated by farms. The constraint on the relationship 
between emission at all farms and aggregate pollution is:
                 (1)
Thus, the social Lagrangian is:
                 (2)
with the following equations specifying the first-order condi-
tions:
      for all n and j        (3)
      for all j          (4)
where:
 p  price vector (1×N)
 α, µ appropriate Lagrange multipliers
 hjz   partial derivative of the contribution function, h(z),  
  with respect to zj and interpreted as farm j’s 
    pollution contribution rate.
The optimal economic incentive (s*j ) for farm j with minimum 
costs is shown to be:
               (5)
The optimal economic incentives vary across farms when farms 
have different contributions to aggregate pollution. Similarly, a 
system of standards on emissions from all farms can be derived 
as the dual of the variable economic incentive using the same 
framework presented above. Qiu and Prato (1999) implemented 
the above theoretical framework by calculating pollution indica-
tors using a two-step procedure. With the 1ststep, the concentra-
tion of nitrate generated by each hydrological response unit is 
calculated. In the 2nd step, the sub-catchment water quality indi-
cators are calculated using area weighting. However, if runoff is 
altered through a specific management practice, area weighting 
is an inappropriate procedure to calculate sub-catchment water 
quality indicators. Weighting should then rather be done accord-
ing to runoff.
 Given the above theoretical development the following 
empirical optimisation model is constructed to determine cost-
effective economic environmental tradeoffs:
                   (6)
                   (7)
                   (8)
                   (9)
                  (10)
                  (11)
                  (12)
                  (13)
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                  (15)
where:
 quantity of crop j planted in month p in sub-
catchment s utilising hydrological response 
unit h, land type l, n kilogram of nitrogen and 
ir mm of water
 gross margin of crop j planted in month p in 
sub-catchment s utilising hydrological response 
unit h, land type l, n kilogram of nitrogen and 
ir mm of water
 land utilisation in month t by crop j planted in 
month p
 area available of hydrological response unit h 
consisting of land-type l in sub-catchment s 
 total catchment land utilisation factor
 maximum percentage of crop j planted in 
month p in crop mix
 gross irrigation requirement of crop j planted 
in month p in sub-catchment s utilising hydro-
logical response unit h, land type l, n kilogram 
of nitrogen and ir mm of water
 allocs water allocated to sub-catchment s
 bsis baseline water quality indicator in sub-catch-
ment s
 As pollution abatement by sub-catchment s
 Ps pollution generated by sub-catchment s
 Cs pollution contribution rate of sub-catchment s
 bi baseline total catchment pollution indicator
 a necessary pollution abatement level
  runoff generated by growing crop j planted in 
month p in sub-catchment s utilising hydrolog-
ical response unit h, land type l, n kilogram of 
nitrogen and ir mm of water
  nitrate emissions generated by growing crop j 
planted in month p in sub-catchment s utilis-
ing hydrological response unit h, land type l, n 
kilogram of nitrogen and ir mm of water
The convention is followed in the above specification whereby 
capital letters denote variables and small letters denote data 
parameters or tables. The baseline model comprised Eqs. (6) 
to (9) and is used to determine baseline nitrate pollution indi-
cators at the sub-catchment and total catchment level from 
which water quality improvements are modelled. Total catch-
ment gross margins are optimised with the baseline model 
given constraints regarding total land and water availability, 
as well as maximum specific crop area utilisation factors. 
The area utilisation factors are used to calibrate the model 
to better represent the relative importance between different 
crops. The other equations are added to the second model to 
determine cost-effective economic environmental tradeoffs. 
More specifically, Eqs. (12) to (14) are used to determine sub-
catchment pollution indicators as a function of nitrate loss and 
runoff, whereas Eq. (15) is used to determine each sub-catch-
ment’s contribution as a function of runoff. Equation (11) 
ensures that the sum of weighted pollution abatement by each 
sub-catchment is greater or equal to the desired level of pol-
lution abatement, while Eq. (10) ensures that each sub-catch-
ment may not pollute more than baseline levels. The model 
is solved with MINOS (Murtagh and Saunders, 1987) using 
the general algebraic modelling system (GAMS) (Brooke et 
al., 1998).
Data development
The research was conducted in the Gamtoos River catchment 
situated about 100 km west of Port Elizabeth on the Eastern 
Cape coast between latitude 33°58’ and longitude 25°01’ East. 
The Gamtoos River is formed by the confluence of the Kouga 
and Groot Rivers. The drainage area of the 70 km-long Gam-
toos River, which is surrounded by the Baviaanskloof Moun-
tains, constitutes an area 1 357 km2. Typically the entire valley 
is divided into three sub-districts namely Patensie, Hanky and 
Loerie/Mondplaas with a total listed irrigation area of 7 412 ha. 
The most important crops grown in the valley are citrus, pota-
toes, maize, wheat and other vegetables. Micro- and drip-irriga-
tion are predominantly used to irrigate citrus while the other 
crops are grown using centre-pivot irrigation.
 The soil and water assessment tool (SWAT) (Neitsch et 
al., 2001) was used to generate the necessary input parameters 
for the spatial optimisation model. Spatial analyst was used to 
automatically delineate 22 sub-catchments from the confluence 
of the Gamtoos and the Groot Rivers downstream to the coast 
using a digital elevation model (DEM) with a 20 m resolution. 
Model inputs were then developed for each of the sub-catch-
ments. 
 Schulze et al. (1995) developed hydrological attributes for the 
land-type database of the Institute for Soil, Climate and Water 
(ISCW) which were used as the basis of soils information. After 
the soils information is specified the land use determines the pur-
pose for which the soil is used. At first the land use was divided 
into two broad categories, irrigated and non-irrigated. The irri-
gation areas in the Gamtoos irrigation valley were digitised from 
1:50 000 digital ortho-photo images obtained from the Depart-
ment of Land Affairs, Chief Directorate, Surveys and Mapping. 
Once the irrigation theme was established it was combined with 
the catchment theme to determine the non-irrigated areas using 
GIS processing. The impact of non-irrigated land was held con-
stant in this research. Once these inputs are specified each of the 
sub-catchments are further partitioned into hydrological response 
units (HRUs), which are lumped areas within the sub-catchment 
with different hydrological impacts that are comprised of unique 
land cover, soil and management combinations. HRUs allow for 
a better physical representation of the catchment since each HRU 
is simulated separately after which the results are aggregated to 
determine the resulting pollution loading for the sub-catchment 
as a whole. In total 129 HRUs are developed of which 53 are used 
for irrigation purposes. 
 The effects of 229 alternative crop, water and fertiliser input 
combinations on nitrate pollution parameters were simulated 
with SWAT using 15 years of historical weather data. The same 
management alternative is applied to all the different HRUs that 
are used for crop production while keeping the impact of the 
others constant when simulating the water quality impacts of a 
specific management alternative. Thus, a separate simulation is 
needed for each of the management scenarios, which amounts 
to 228 SWAT runs. Monthly results for each of the HRUs are 
saved in the basins.sbs file that is created during each SWAT 
run. The basins.sbs files contain all the necessary information 
needed to quantify the pollution impact of the alternative man-
agement practices, which are needed by the optimisation model. 
Simulated results showed that crop yield is not very responsive 
to alternative management scenarios and therefore procedures 
proposed by Qui (1996) were used to determine crop yield based 
on potential crop yield and a yield indexed developed from the 
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Results
Baseline
Given the specification of the mathematical programming 
model outlined above baseline pollution levels are needed from 
which to model the economic environmental tradeoffs concern-
ing nitrate water quality improvement. Since only two crops are 
used to approximate the impact of alternative strategies to lessen 
the harmful effects of nitrate pollution, the actual land use can-
not be used as a baseline. Instead a programming model with no 
constraints on pollution was used to determine the optimal land 
use for the Gamtoos irrigation valley, given only potato and cab-
bage crops can be planted during different time periods. 
 When using potato and cabbage as proxies for the other 
crops grown in the Gamtoos catchment a total gross margin 
above specified cost of R325 m. is generated. In total 9 690 ha 
is irrigated throughout the year giving a land utilisation factor 
of 1.43. Constraints in the programming model on the maximum 
percentage of hectares planted to a certain crop with a specific 
planting date ensure that the proportion between potatoes and 
cabbage in the baseline portrays the relative importance of these 
crops in the catchment. In total 1 805 ha of cabbage and 7 885 ha 
of potatoes are planted in the optimal baseline solution. Gross 
margins per hectare planted in a sub-catchment range from a 
minimum of R23 240 in Sub13 (sub-catchment) to a maximum 
of R43 108 in Sub 5. The average gross margin is R31 765/ha. 
 In the next section the nitrate water quality indicators at the 
catchment and sub-catchment level calculated from the opti-
mised baseline land use with only potatoes an cabbage are used 
as baseline pollution levels from which economic environmental 
tradeoffs are quantified.
Cost-effective economic environmental tradeoffs
Recall that a cost-effective pollution control policy was previ-
ously defined as one which achieves a specific pollution level 
at minimum cost. Thus, the main objective of this section is to 
determine the spatial allocation of alternative management prac-
tices that will achieve a specific reduction in the water quality 
indicator relative to the baseline catchment indicator determined 
in the previous section at least cost. The economic environmental 
tradeoffs are evaluated with the programming model specified 
above by lowering the baseline nitrate water quality indicator 
through the multiplication of appropriate reduction levels. The 
programming model is structured such that each sub-catchment 
may not pollute more than the baseline pollution levels. How-
ever, the pollution contribution rates are not kept constant since 
each sub-catchment’s contribution rate may be altered through 
changes in irrigation scheduling strategies or when some land 
has to go out of production.
Total catchment level
The typical downward sloping tradeoff curve between nitrate 
water quality improvement at the catchment outlet and total 
gross margins for the total catchment is shown in Fig. 1.
 From Fig. 1 it is evident that an improvement of 20% in the 
nitrate water quality indicator at the catchment outlet is possible 
without reducing total catchment gross margins significantly. 
To improve the water quality indicator by 20% total catchment 
gross margin is reduced by only R1 m. Total catchment gross 
margin is reduced more severely between the 20% and 50% 
levels of improving the catchment water quality indicator. 
Improving water quality by another 30 percentage points from 
the 20% level will reduce total catchment gross margins by 
another R35 m. from R325 m. to R290 m. Up to a 50% improve-
ment in the water quality indicator farmers are able to minimise 
abatement cost through their choice of management practices 
and reallocating production spatially over the catchment with-
out lowering the land utilisation factor of 1.43 established in the 
baseline. In order to improve water quality by more than 50% 
some land has to go out of production, resulting in drastic reduc-
tions in total catchment gross margin. Abatement cost amounts 
to R135 m. to improve water quality by 70%.
 Results from the above discussion clearly show that the pro-
gramming model is capable of quantifying the necessary eco-
nomic environmental tradeoffs of increasing water quality. One 
can conclude that water quality improvements of up to 20% will 
come at a low cost given that the spatial allocation of the man-
agement practices is obtained. However, more important are the 
tradeoffs at the sub-catchment level when trying to implement 
socially acceptable pollution abatement policies especially if it 
means that some farmers have to cease farming while others are 
increasing their production. 
Sub-catchment level
Tradeoffs at the sub-catchment level are used to explain the 
tradeoff at the catchment level. To gain a better understanding 
of the type of tradeoffs that exist at the sub-catchment level sub-
catchments were grouped into two groups based on the shape 
of their tradeoffs up to the 20% pollution abatement level. The 
tradeoffs that exist within these two groups are also shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 Significant tradeoffs exist for both groups with the main dif-
ference being the fact that both positive and negative tradeoffs 
are modelled up to a 20% improvement in the nitrate water qual-
ity indicator. For Group A total gross margins are reduced by 
R56 m.  from R213 m.  to R157 m., which is R21 m.  more than 
at the total catchment level. In contrast the total gross margin for 
Group B increases by R55 m. resulting in a net effect of R1 m. at 
the total catchment level.
 The inverse tradeoff modelled is mainly due to a decrease in 
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Catchment and sub-catchment level cost-effective economic 
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in the area in the second group. Thus, a spatial redistribution 
of production takes place without lowering the land utilisation 
factor. Most of the crops in the Gamtoos valley are grown on 
contract. Only a limited number of contracts are available each 
year and therefore it is possible that some catchments with lower 
abatement cost may acquire more production contracts. Mostly 
cabbage areas are spatially redistributed between the two groups. 
Within the sub-catchments of each group and between the two 
groups, tradeoffs between fertiliser application rates, irrigation 
level, gross margins, nitrate emissions and each catchment’s 
pollution contribution rate determine the unique spatial land use 
that complies with the nitrate water quality indicator levels set at 
each sub-catchment and at the total catchment outlet. An impor-
tant result is that although the total amount of nitrate emission 
in Group B increased due to an increase in area irrigated each 
sub-catchment still complied with the water quality indicator. 
Thus, changes in irrigation schedules result in increased dilution 
capacity. 
 Once pollution reduction is shifted between different catch-
ments the tradeoffs tend to stabilise up to a 50% pollution abate-
ment level. Beyond the 50% level total gross margins for the 
sub-catchments in Group A are reduced very significantly due 
to reductions in the area irrigated while those of the sub-catch-
ments in the second group remain relatively constant.
 The above results clearly indicate that despite the fact that 
relatively little tradeoff exists at the catchment level significant 
tradeoffs exist at the sub-catchment level. When expressed per 
hectare planted the abatement cost at the catchment level is 
R103 whereas it is R5 779 for Group A. Given the high cost in 
Group A it is concluded that the choice of pollution abatement 
levels based on catchment level tradeoffs may not be acceptable 
at the sub-catchment level because it will cause some farmers to 
cease their farming activities while others are expanding their 
production. Furthermore using a reduction in pollution emis-
sions as policy goal may result in tradeoff curves with high 
abatement costs since it ignores the dilution capacity of water 
and changes in contribution rates.
 Figure 1 gives a clear indication of the positive and negative 
tradeoffs associated with increasing water quality but gives no 
indication of the spatial variability of the magnitude of pollu-
tion abatement necessary to comply with specific water quality 
standards as well as the associated economic impact. 
Spatial variability 
Figure 2 shows the spatial variability in pollution abatement 
for each of the 22 sub-catchments for three different pollution 
abatement levels at the total catchment level. 
 If the nitrate water quality indicator has to improve by 10% 
it is clear that some sub-catchments need not abate any pollu-
tion. The variability in the magnitude of the sub-catchments 
that needs to abate pollution to comply with the water quality 
standard at the catchment outlet is significant. Sub17 has to 
abate about 55% of its pollution whereas Sub 9 has to reduce 
its pollution levels by about 4%. As the water quality standard 
at the catchment outlet is increased more sub-catchments need 
to abate pollution. To improve the overall water quality indica-
tor by 50% all the sub-catchments need to abate some pollu-
tion with most of them having to abate their pollution by more 
than 40% to comply with the standard at the catchment outlet. 
All the sub-catchments have to abate pollution when improving 
the water quality indicator by 90%. Furthermore some catch-
ments will have to go out of production to comply with the water 
quality standard. An abatement level of 100% is modelled for 
neither of the sub-catchments due to lower bounds on the amount 
of runoff from each sub-catchment to prohibit division by zero 
in the programming model. The pollution contribution factors 
optimised for these sub-catchments are, however, so low that the 
water quality abatement levels have little effect on the overall 
result. The conclusion is drawn that water quality abatement at 
the sub-catchment level will not give a true indication of water 
quality improvement at the catchment outlet if evaluated in iso-
lation of the specific catchment’s contribution factor. Also sig-
nificant variation exists in sub-catchment pollution abatement 
levels to comply with the catchment water quality standard. The 
spatial variability of gross margins associated with the pollution 
abatement levels at sub-catchment level is evaluated next.
 Figure 3 shows the associated variability in abatement 
cost for the three different levels of pollution abatement at the 
catchment outlet. A negative abatement percentage for a spe-
cific catchment represents gains above the specified baseline 
gross margins. From Fig. 3 it is clear that abatement cost is high 
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Also abatement cost is highly variable between sub-catchments. 
None of the gross margins for the three pollution abatement 
levels follow pollution abatement particularly well (shown in 
Fig. 2). For instance Sub 7 and Sub 9 has to abate more or less the 
same amount of pollution to improve water quality by 90% but 
Sub 7 has a gross margin of about 50% more than baseline level 
whereas Sub 9 has an abatement cost of about 50%. Percent-
age reductions in gross margins are not proportional to pollution 
abatement because of different pollution baseline levels and the 
fact that sub-catchment abatement cost is a function of the pol-
lution abatement level and its contributing factor.
 The conclusion is made that high abatement cost may cause 
farming to be unprofitable in some sub-catchments. Further-
more each sub-catchment’s baseline pollution levels as well its 
contribution to the pollution at the outlet of the Gamtoos are 
important factors determining pollution abatement cost. When 
interpreted differently the contribution factor means the spatial 
location of one sub-catchment relative to another.
Conclusions and implications
The main concern of this paper was to develop a modelling 
framework that will allow advisors in the field of pollution con-
trol to establish a cost effective benchmark with which alter-
native policy instruments can be compared to determine their 
relative cost-effectiveness. Cognisance should be taken of the 
fact that the pollution contribution factor plays a cardinal role 
in determining pollution abatement cost. The importance of the 
contribution factor highlights the necessity of taking the interde-
pendencies between management units into account when mod-
elling economic environmental tradeoffs. Lichtenberg (2000) 
acknowledges this result and reasons that ignoring transport 
linkages to receiving water bodies as well as the link between 
emitted pollutants and ambient pollution levels and therefore 
the interrelated linkages between agricultural production prac-
tices and pollution damage may stem relative comparisons 
between alternative policies inappropriate. The establishment 
of the cost-effective tradeoffs in an ideal world where the set of 
policy instruments is not restricted and there are no transaction 
costs associated with implementing optimally designed policies 
present the first step towards the evaluation of the relative cost 
effectiveness of alternative instruments to control NPS pollu-
tion. A logical next step is to alter the model to quantify eco-
nomic environmental tradeoffs of such instruments. 
 Another important result that emanates from the tradeoff 
analyses is the significant differences between total catchment 
and sub-catchment level tradeoffs. The sub-catchment level 
tradeoffs explaining the catchment level tradeoffs are much 
more important in determining irrigation farming profitability 
and therefore the impact on the economy of the region. Although 
catchments and sub-catchments constitute logical planning units 
from an environmental viewpoint it does not coincide with the 
management units and political boundaries. However, water pol-
lution is determined by decisions made within political bounda-
ries and management units. The policy challenge is to harmo-
nise economic development within political boundaries as well 
as decisions made at farm level with sustainable environmental 
protection. Brooks et al. (1994) reason that this should be done 
by realistically integrating these views by adapting catchment 
management to economic and social realities. The conclusion 
is that care should be taken not to compare the relative cost-
effectiveness of alternative policy instruments to control NPS 
pollution based on catchment level tradeoffs alone.
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